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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HARRY J. McCORMICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Ut;ah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

12712

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant petitioned the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, for a writ of habeas
corpus stating that his plea of guilty to the charge of robbery was not intelligently and voluntarily entered.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a hearing of the facts, the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin denied appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the order of the lower court
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant except as hereinafter set forth.
Because appellant did not cooperate with his counsel,
Mr. Edmonds was not prepared at the time of trial to defend the appellant. Mr. Edmonds asked for a continuance
and also a severance. After some discussion, counsel for
the State, Mr. Haycock, had no objection if he could be
assured that appellant would be available for trial. (Trial
Transcript, p. 5; hereinafter referred to as "T."). After
granting the motion to sever, the court increased the bond
and set a new trial date for the appellant (T. 8).
During the Habeas Corpus proceeding, when asked
if he had adequate counsel, appellant replied, "I don't see
that I have any grounds to say I didn't." (Habeas Corpus
Hearing, p. 12; hereinafter referred to as "H.").
The appellant had a high school education (H. 9).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED BECAUSE HE
WAS ADVISED BY COMPETENT COUNSEL, HE WAS AWARE OF THE CHARGES
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AGAINST HIM, AND HE WAS IN CONTROL OF HIS MENTAL FACULTIES.
'The vuEdity of a guilty plea depends on two requirements. First, the record must affirmatively show that the
defendant entered his plea of guilty intelligently, sometimes called "knowingly" or "understandingly." Second,
the record must affirmatively show that the guilty plea
was voluntarily made. Boykin v. Awbama, 395 U. S. 238,
244 (1939). This standard has been reaffirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in subsequent cases. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970) and
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759 (1970).
The elements of the first requirement that the plea
be entered intelligently, are set forth in Brady v. United
States, supra. The defendant pled guilty to the charge
of kidnapping after a co-defendant pled guilty to the
same charge and became available to testify against the
defendant. The Court held that the defendant's plea was
made intelligently because the record showed that:
"He was advised by competent counsel, he was
made aware of the nature of the charge against
him, and there was nothing to indicate that he was
incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental faculties." Id. at 756.
The record shows that appellant's plea meets these
three elements of an intelligently entered plea of guilty.
First, appellant was advised by competent counsel. When
asked if he had adequate counsel, appellant replied, "I
don't see that I have any grounds to say I didn't" (H.
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12). The record shows no indication that appellant did
not have adequate counsel. Second, appellant was aware
of the charges against him. He replied affirmatively to 1
the questions: do you understand that by pleading guilty :
you (1) "admit you robbed the person named in the com- '
plaint," (2) "waive your right to trial by jury," and (3)
"can be sent to the prison for from five years to life" (T.
9). Third, appellant admitted that he was not under the
influence of alcohol or drugs and that he was not suffering from any physical defects (T. 10). Therefore, appellant's plea was intelligently entered according to the
standard set forth in Brady.
Appellant contends that m addition to the Brady
standard, the record must show that appellant specifically
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to confront his accusers. In support of this contention, appellant looks to Boykin v. Alabama, supra, where
the record did not show that the judge asked any questions of the petitioner concerning his plea nor that the
petitioner even addressed the court. The court found the
guilty plea invalid because "the record does not disclose
that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty." Id. at 244.
The court found no new requirement that the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confront
one's accusers must be specifically waived in order for
a plea of guilty to be made intelligently. Boykin only
held that a waiver of these rights cannot be presumed

5
from a silent record. Id. at 243. The Court in the subsequent case of Brady found that:
"The new element added in Boy kin was the requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered
his plea understandingly and voluntarily." 297
U.S. at 748, n. 4.
None of the United States Supreme Court cases after
Boykin hav2 required a judge to get a specific waiver of
lhe r:ghts suggested by appellant. See Brady v. United
StT'es, supra, McMann v. Richardson, supra, Parker v.
North C'arolina,
U. S. 790 (1970), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (1970). The only new requirement is that the elements of a valid guilty plea must be
affirlllatively disclosed in the record.
The specific waiving of certain constitutional rights
hns been found an unnecessary element of a valid guilty
plea in United States v. Webb, 433 F. 2d 400 (1st Cir.
1970). After discussion with counsel, the defendant pled
guilty to violation of the Dyer Act. He later contended
that the court failed to inform him that by pleading
guilty, he was waiving his right to trial by jury, his right
to confront his accusers and his privilege against self-incrimination. The court held that it was self-evident that
these rights were being waived and that it would not add
to defendant's understanding to "require the court to recite a ritualistic list of constitutional rights that are obviously being waived." Id. at 403. Case authority does
not support appellant's contention that certain constitu-
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tional rights must be specifically waived before a plea of
guilty can be ir1telligently entered.
The record is not silent. It affirmatively shows that
the appellant intelligently entered a plea of guitly, He
was advised by competent counsel, aware of the charges
against him and knew the possible sentence he would
receive. Appellant was in full control of his mental faculties and understood the question presented to him. He
had a high school education (H. 9). In addition to meeting the elements of an intelligently entered plea as required by Brady, the appellant admitted that he did in
fact rob the person named in the complaint. There was
no denial of any of appellant's constitutional rights because his plea of guilty was intelligently entered.

POINT II.
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GU IL TY WAS
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED BECAUSE
THERE WERE NO THREATS, MISREPRESENTATIONS OR IMPROPER PROMISES
MADE THAT RESULTED IN COERCION.
The second requirement of a valid guilty plea is that
the record must affirmatively show that the plea was
entered voltLritarily. The standard as to the voluntariness
of guilty pleas used by the United States Supreme Court
as set forth in Brady v. United States, supra, is that de·
fined by Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:

!
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"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of
the direct consequences, including the actual value
of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises) , or perhaps by promises that are by their nature imroper
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." Id. at 755.
Appellant contends that his plea was a result of coercion because this standard of Brady was not met. Appellant alleges that he had only a short time to talk with
his counsel, he was told by his counsel that there was a
good possibility of probation, he was threatened when the
court increased the bond and he wanted to avoid going
to jail.
The Utah Supreme Court places little importance
on the amount of time that a defendant spends with his
counsel. In Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P. 2d
323 (1969), the petitioer alleged that his guilty plea resulted from coercion. He said that his attorney held only
brief conferences with him. Justice Crockett said, "A
conference is not inherently wrong simply because it does
not take a long time. It is what was done that is important, not the time consumed in doing it." 452 P. 2d at
325. The record does not show nor does appellant contend
that he received inadequate advice. Since appellant was
adequately represented, the amount of time he spent with
his counsel is irrelevant.
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A.ppellant further contends that his plea was involuntary because he was told by his counsel that there was
a good possibility of probation. In United States v. vV'arden, Vvestfield State Farm, 408 F. 2d 1326 (2nd Cir.
1969), the petitioner contested the validity of his guilty
plea because his counsel told him that the petitioner
would get a lesser sentence than that which he actually
received. The court held, "An erroneous sentence estimate by defense counsel does not render a plea involuntarily." Id. at 1330. The record in the instant case does
not show whether or not there was in fact a good possibility, that fact alone would not render the plea involun-

tary.

Appellant next contends that the raising of the bond
from $2,500 to $15,000 just before he pled guilty was a
threat which made his plea involuntary. However, the
record shows that the increase of the bond was not a
threat or any type of coercion, but a valid judicial method
of insuring that appellant would appear. Because appellant did not cooperate with his counsel, Mr. Edmonds
was not prepared at the time of trial to defend the appellant (T. 2). Mr. Edmonds asked for a continuance. After
some discussion, counsel for the State, Mr. Haycock, had
no objection to a continuance if it could be assured that
appellant would be available for trial (T. 5). To provide
that assurance, the bail was increased to $15,000. Thus,
there were no threats, misrepresentations or improper
promises. The legitimate operation of a court cannot be
construed as a threat. The raising of the bond did have
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a relationship to the business of the court in assuring
that persons are available to trial when scheduled.
Finally appellant contends that he pied guilty bec:o:use he wanted to avoid going to jail. However, other
seemingly more flagrant inducements to plead guilty
have not amounted to coercion. The court in Brady found
that fear of a possible death sentence did not destroy the
voluntariness of a plea. In the case of McGuffey v.
Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P. 2d 166 (1967), the court
found that defendant's guilty plea was not coerced where
official action in dismissing the charge of robbery against
the defendant's wife was an act of sympathetic public
policy rather than a bargain made with the defendant.
However, in Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d
437 (1971), the court found that the defendant was not
coerced even though there was an agreement whereby
similar charges against his wife would be dropped if he
pled guilty. In Strong v. Turner, supra, the defendant
pied guilty to one of several charges on the condition that
the others would be dropped. The court found no coercion involved because:
"There is nothing in this record to justify a conclusion that the will of the plaintiff was overcome,
or that he did not rationally weigh the choices
before him and choose the one which he then
thought was most beneficial to his interest." 452
P. 2d 324.
Appellant's fear of going to prison is minimal when compared with more serious fears and inducements that have
not involved coercion. Appellant knew that by pleading
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guilty he could be sent to prison for from five years to
life (T. 9). Also, there is nothing in the record that shows
that appellant's will was overcome or that he did not
rationally weigh the choices before him.
Appellant's plea complies with the elements of a
voluntarily entered plea as set forth in Brady. The record affirmatively shows that there were no threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. Appellant denies
that anyone had threatened him or made him any promises of leniency (T. 9). He said that he freely and voluntarily answered all questions that were asked him by his
own counsel.

CONCLUSION
The record affirmatively shows that appellant's plea
of guilty was made intelligently and voluntarily. The
order of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID 8. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

